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CROCODILES IN THE BATHTUB:
MAINTAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF STATE




The late Honorable Otto Kaus, who served on the California
Supreme Court from 1980 through 1985, used a marvelous metaphor
to describe the dilemma of deciding controversial cases while facing
reelection. He said it was like finding a crocodile in your bathtub
when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you
try not to think about it, but it's hard to think about much else while
you're shaving.1
In 1996, we saw two more respected and conscientious state
supreme courtjustices fall victim to the crocodile's bite. Justice Penny
White was appointed to the Tennessee Supreme Court in January of
1995. She participated in one death penalty decision, joining two
other justices on her fivejudge court in reversing a death penalty
judgment in June of 1996.2 By unhappy coincidence, Justice White
was the only supreme court justice on the ballot two months later.
The Governor saw an opportunity to gain another Republican seat on
the court. He denouncedJustice White as ajudge who was soft on the
death penalty and weak on victims' rights. His campaign succeeded,
and she was removed from office after winning only 44.8% of the
votes.3
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. BA. Loyola
Marymount University, Los Angeles 1962; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center
1965; LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center 1966. Louis Parise, J.D. Santa Clara
University School of Law 1997, provided substantial research assistance for this article.
1 See Paul Reidinger, The Politics ofJudging, 52 A.BA. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58;
Gerald F. Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the Crocodile, 30 Loy. L.- L. REv. 971 (1997)
(forthcoming).
2 Tennessee v. Odom, No. 02-S-01-9502-CROO014 (Tenn. June 3, 1996).
3 John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, A.BA. J., Nov. 1996, at 50, 53-54.
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Justice David Lanphier was appointed to the Nebraska Supreme
Court in 1993, shortly after a term limits initiative measure was
adopted by Nebraska voters by a 70% margin. In May 1994, Justice
Lanphier authored a unanimous opinion of the Nebraska Supreme
Court holding the term limits initiative invalid, because it had not
complied with a constitutional amendment increasing the number of
signatures required to qualify the measure for the ballot.4 The spon-
sors of the initiative then trained their sights on Justice Lanphier, and
mounted a well-financed campaign to unseat him. Last November, he
was removed by the voters, winning only 32% of the vote in a reten-
tion election. 5
The justices of supreme courts in twenty-three states face con-
tested elections at some stage in their career.6 Supreme court justices
in another fifteen states face retention elections to keep their jobs.7
The death penalty is not the only crocodile in their bathtubs. Abor-
tion remains a hot-button issue in many states, and final resolution of
federal issues now clears the deck for state constitutional issues to be
presented for the first time to many state supreme courts. And in the
twenty-one states that allow legislation by popular initiative, justices
frequently encounter an accusation that they are thwarting the voters'
will by striking down popular initiative measures.
The vulnerability of state supreme court justices has also been
enhanced by a number of "megatrends" in the life of modem
America. The nature and extent of media coverage of judicial pro-
ceedings has changed dramatically in recent years. The tabloidization
of the media, ratings-driven competition in more diverse media mar-
kets, and the reduction of news coverage to ten second sound bites
have rendered efforts to educate the public about the judicial process
largely ineffectual. The climate of political discourse has also sharply
deteriorated, with partisan maneuvering and lack of civility becoming
defining elements. Political lobbies and special interest groups no
longer confine their persuasive efforts to the legislative process, but
4 Duggan v. Beerman, 515 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1994).
5 Leslie Boellstorff, Lanphier Loses Seat on Supreme Court, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Nov. 6, 1996, at 1.
6 Justices are elected in partisan elections in Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Missis-
sippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia. Non-par-
tisan contested elections are held in Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington and
Wisconsin. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1988, § I, at 8.
7 "Yes-no" retention elections are currently utilized in Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming. Id.
[VOL. 72:41134
HeinOnline  -- 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1134 1996-1997
CROCODILES IN THE BATHTUB
closely follow court decisions. Supreme courtjustices who not so long
ago quietly contemplated the polite parsing of their opinions by aca-
demic scholars, now encounter furious denunciation by special inter-
ests who, while frequently appearing as friends of the court, are often
the court's worst enemies.
The greatest challenge facing state supreme courts in the coming
century will be the maintenance ofjudicial independence in an era of
increasing politicization of the judicial office. I believe the biggest
mistake we can make in facing this challenge is to throw it into the
laps of the justices, and tell them "it's your problem." Obviously, it is a
problem for every citizen devoted to the rule of law and its preserva-
tion. Most especially, it is a problem that demands a major commit-
ment from the organized bar.
And speaking of crocodiles, we need to contemplate the lesson
taught by one of the greatest philosophers ever to emerge from an
American swamp. I refer, of course, to Pogo, the wise possum created
by cartoonist Walt Kelly. Pogo was heard to say, on a number of occa-
sions, "We have met the enemy and he is us." When he said that,
Pogo was frequently speaking to his friend, Albert. Albert was a croco-
dile of the alligator species who smoked cigars. As in the cartoon, we
can't kill the crocodile. The crocodile is not an alien invader, but a
manifestation of the public which our courts serve. The question for
us to contemplate is, how can one serve the crocodile without becom-
ing its meal? Let me take you through the swamp. We may find there
are valuable lessons to be learned from some of our encounters with
crocodiles during the past ten years.
1I. THE FATTEST CROCODILE: THE DEATH PENALTY
The American appetite for the death penalty is best reflected in
one stark statistic. There are now more than three thousand men and
women on death rows in America. At the close of 1996, California led
the parade with 420, Texas had 404, Florida was at 362, and Penn-
sylvania was in fourth place with 196.8 The supreme courts of these
and other states find that the processing of death penalty appeals and
petitions for postconviction relief consumes a bigger slice of the
docket each succeeding year. To get a quick estimate, I counted up
the total number of published opinions produced by the supreme
courts of six death penalty states for 1985, and again for 1995, the
most recent year for which data is available. I then ascertained what
proportion of these opinions were death penalty cases. The six states
8 Rate of Executions Soaring as Death-Penalty Foes Falter, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWs,
Dec. 5, 1996, at A10.
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selected were California, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Texas and Virginia.
It's interesting that the total number of published opinions produced
by these courts actually declined 13.5% during the ten year interval
ending in 1995. Like the United States Supreme Court, state supreme
courts are becoming more selective in filling their dockets, and they
are deciding fewer cases. But there is one portion of their docket that
these courts have little control over: the automatic appeals of death
penalty judgments. The number of death penalty cases decided by
these six courts increased 31% between 1985 and 1995. In 1985, 5.5%
of the published opinions produced by these six courts were in death
cases. In 1995, that proportion increased to 8.3%. The number of
published opinions, of course, is a rather crude measure of the pro-
portion of a state supreme court justice's workload that is devoted to
death penalty review. Many justices in these states would agree with
the estimate of recently retired California Chief Justice Malcolm Lu-
cas, who told me death cases are now 20 to 25% of the workload of the
California Supreme Court.9
What may be most disconcerting about the death penalty cases
during the past ten years, however, is the increase in the rate of affirm-
ance by some state supreme courts. Ten years ago, these six supreme
courts affirmed 63% of the death penalty judgments they reviewed. In
1995, 90% of the death penalty judgments reviewed were affirmed.
While California accounts for a disproportionate share of this sample,
going from an affirmance rate of zero in 1985 to a rate of 94% in
1995, the affirmance rate in Texas went from 86% to 96% during the
same ten year period. While some of this increase may be attributable
to the law becoming more settled, I don't believe it can be denied that
some of the increase is attributable to the presence of the crocodile in
the bathtub. There are disturbing indications that judicial reluctance
to reverse death penalty judgments may sometimes be reluctance to
expose one's posterior to the wrath of the electorate. Crocodiles do
occasionally bite.
In California, as we well know, three justices were removed from
the state supreme court in the purge of 1986. The campaign that un-
seated them featured campaign ads promising that "no" votes against
the retention of these three justices was the equivalent of three "yes"
votes for the death penalty.10 Apparently, we set a standard for judi-
cial politicking that has been emulated beyond our borders. Supreme
court elections in at least ten states have been dominated by death
9 Gerald F. Uelmen, The Lucas Legacy, CAL. LAW., May 1996, at 29, 31.
10 Gerald F. Uelmen, Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S.
CAL. L. Ray. 2069, 2070 (1988).
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penalty politicking in the past decade, and California and Tennessee
are not the only states to see incumbent justices removed. Two jus-
tices were removed from the Mississippi Supreme Court after two sep-
arate campaigns focusing on death penalty issues. Justice James
Robertson was defeated in 1992, after he was attacked for two dissent-
ing opinions in death penalty affirmances. Ironically, when both cases
were reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, the majority
agreed with Justice Robertson's dissents and reversed the convic-
tions." In 1990, Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Joel Blass was de-
feated by an opponent promising to be a "tough judge for tough
times," who attacked the incumbent justice for being "soft on crime."
In both contested elections, the challenger was endorsed by the Mis-
sissippi Prosecutors Association. 12
In 1992 1 published the results of a study correlating death pen-
alty affirmance rates for all state supreme courts for the ten year pe-
riod ending in 1987, with the manner ofjudicial selection used for the
justices on those courts. The thirty-eight states that then had a death
penalty included states that appoint their justices for life, as in the
federal system; states that utilize uncontested retention elections like
California and Arizona; states that permit contested but nonpartisan
elections like Georgia and Illinois; states that require judges to run
under party labels, like Texas and Mississippi; and even a handful of
states where justices are elected by the legislature, such as Virginia and
South Carolina. The results suggest that judges whose tenure is more
secure are more willing to overturn a death penalty judgment:' 3
Executive Appointment ................................... 26.3%
Uncontested Retention Elections ......................... 55.3%
Nonpartisan Contested Elections .......................... 62.9%
Partisan Contested Elections .............................. 62.5%
Legislative Elections ...................................... 63.7%
In California, the crush of the death penalty caseload engen-
dered a proposal to eliminate automatic direct review of all death pen-
alty cases by the supreme court.14 That could also dissipate the
11 Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 763-64
(1995).
12 Id.
13 Gerald F. Uelmen, Elected Judiciay, in LEONARD W. LEVY, ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supp. I, at 171 (1992).
14 Robert Weisberg, Redistributing the Wealth of Capital Cases: ChangingDeath Penalty
Appeals in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 243 (1988); Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of
Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy.
LA. L. REV. 237, 292-96 (1989).
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political pressure so intensely focused upon the seven justices of the
supreme court by the volatile death penalty issue. The automatic ap-
peal of as many as forty-six new death judgments in one year directly
from the trial court to the supreme court imposes burdens on the
court that could just as expeditiously be handled by the intermediate
courts of appeal. The intermediate courts of appeal have grown along
with their caseload, but the size of the supreme court has remained
constant for over a century. In some states, the direct appeal of death
judgments to the state supreme court is an anomaly, established long
before intermediate appellate courts even existed. Why should death
penalty cases be singled out for direct access to the supreme court
docket, when all other cases must compete for the court's limited re-
source of final review?
The traditional answer, of course, is that consistency in adminis-
tering the ultimate punishment demands final review by the same
body of judges in every case. Actually, final review by the supreme
court could be preserved, after initial review by an intermediate court.
The supreme court would still be spared sifting through all the pre-
liminary procedural obstacles like appointment of counsel and certify-
ing the record. It is much easier to review a case that has already been
reviewed by a lower court. Cases reversed by the lower court would
not even have to be heard. And even if final supreme court review
were discretionary, the uniformity of ultimate judgment would be pre-
served in the process of considering applications for discretionary
review.
Some resistance to this proposal comes, as might be expected,
from the judges of the intermediate courts of appeal. They have to
face retention elections too. Why should they be saddled with the
political burden that supreme court justices must currently bear, with-
out any of the rewards? The greatest opposition to this proposal, how-
ever, comes from those who strongly support the death penalty itself.
They argue that intermediate appellate review will drag out the review
process in capital cases even longer than it currently is.15 It is interest-
ing to note that one of the few death penalty states that did have re-
view of death penalty appeals by intermediate appellate courts prior to
supreme court review abandoned the practice in 1994. The State
Constitution of Ohio was amended by a vote of the people in 1994 to
eliminate review of death cases by intermediate appellate courts. De-
spite opposition from the state bar and civil liberties organizations,
the measure was sold to the voters as a means of speeding up the
15 See Reducing the Caseload of the Supreme Court: A Debate, 5 CAL. LrrIG., Winter
1992, at 41-46.
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administration of the death penalty.' 6 As a result, the Ohio Supreme
Court, whose justices are elected, reviewed seventeen death penalty
cases in 1995, compared to the three that were reviewed in 1985. The
measure has had no perceptible impact upon their rate of affirmance,
however. In 1985, it was 100%. In 1995, it was 100%. Spreading the
'joy" of reviewing death penalty appeals among a wider population of
appellate judges may be a promising reform in terms of more effi-
ciently managing the workload of state supreme court justices, but it
would be a hard sell to the public in today's climate of impatience
with the delays between verdict and execution. Only Alabama contin-
ues to funnel death cases through the intermediate court of appeals,
and legislation has been proposed to "speed up" death cases by end-
ing the practice there, too.'7
Some have suggested that we look to Texas for a solution. There,
final review is allocated between two courts, one for civil cases and one
for criminal cases. Thus, death penalty cases can be efficiently re-
viewed without diverting the availability of discretionary final review in
civil cases. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals does manage to re-
view about thirty death penalty cases each year. It has even been sug-
gested that a special rotating panel of appellate justices be created in
California, just to handle death penalty cases. While that would cer-
tainly alleviate the docket pressure which death penalty cases create
for the supreme court, it would not address the problem of political
vulnerability for the justices assigned to sit on a special death penalty
review panel. In Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed one
death penalty case in 1993. That was enough to inspire a call for
Republicans to take over the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in
1994. The voters responded to the call. Justice Charles Campbell, a
former prosecutor with twelve years on the bench, was removed.
Among those placed on the court was a lawyer who had been admitted
to the Texas bar for two years, whose campaign platform promised
"the death penalty for killers, greater use of the harmless error doc-
trine, and sanctions for attorneys who file 'frivolous appeals especially
in death penalty cases."18 As already noted, the affirmance rate for
death penalty appeals in Texas rose from 86% in 1985 to 96% in 1995.
The state which seems to have managed the death penalty croco-
dile with greatest success is the state which probably has the largest
16 Bert Lockwood, Voter Initiatives Target Crime in Ohio, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct.
16, 1994, at DI (editorial).
17 Weisberg, supra note 14, at 261.
18 Bright & Keenan, supra note 11, at 761; see also id. at 761-63, 779-80; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., The Politics of HangingJudges, AM. LAw., Dec. 1995, at 35.
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indiginous population of crocodiles: Florida. The Florida Supreme
Court reviewed fifty death penalty judgments in 1995, and chalked up
a reversal rate of 52%, one of the highest reversal rates in America. Is
it because the justices of the Florida Supreme Court are not subjected
to the political pressures prevalent in other death penalty states?
Hardly. Although Florida utilizes a retention election system in which
justices face a yes-no confirmation vote every six years, recent years
have with disturbing regularity seen organized campaigns mounted to
remove targeted justices. In 1990, then Chief Justice Leander Shaw,
Jr. had to raise $300,000 for a campaign to retain his seat in the face of
an organized campaign by anti-abortion forces to remove him from
office. 19 And in 1992, Justice Rosemary Barkett faced an organized
campaign not only by anti-abortion forces, but by prosecutors and po-
lice unhappy that she joined in a dissenting opinion in one controver-
sial death penalty case, even though she had voted to affirm over two
hundred death penalty appeals during her previous nine years on the
court.2 0 While she won retention with 60.9% of the vote, the death
penalty issue was trotted out in an effort to defeat her 1994 appoint-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
and it persuaded presidential candidate Bob Dole to place her on the
list of Clinton appointees he labeled the judicial "hall of shame."21
How is it that Florida has managed to maintain an independent
state supreme court that rigorously reviews death penalty cases, revers-
ing between one-half and one-third of the cases it reviews every year?
One might speculate that Florida has defused public frustration by the
delivery of actual executions. Florida has successfully executed thirty-
eight inmates since 1978, and the Florida Supreme Court has main-
tained a brisk pace of appellate review, deciding as many as seventy-
three death penalty appeals in a single year. Perhaps the public frus-
tration so frequently misdirected at courts is really frustration with the
total lack of executions, rather than with reversals in particular cases.
California in 1986, and Tennessee in 1996, had yet to see their death
penalty law ever enforced. I'm not proposing it as a solution, but one
reality we may have to face is that this crocodile must be occasionally
fed; if he isn't, he will eat his keepers.
That explanation, however, is hard to reconcile with the fact that
Texas has delivered 107 executions since 1978, and the pace of review
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is close to that of Florida.
19 Mark Hansen, The High Cost ofJudging, A.BA. J., Sept. 1991, at 45.
20 Donna O'Neal, Voters Uphold Barkett, ORLANDO SENTINEL Tm., Nov. 4, 1992, at
D1.
21 Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 54.
[VOL- 72:41140
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Why would such a fat, well-fed crocodile turn on its keeper? It may
simply be that Texas crocodiles grow bigger and hungrier than any-
where else, and we shouldn't try to learn anything from the Texas
experience.
Two years ago, a young lawyer who had experienced the Texas
death penalty system first hand, as a law clerk for a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and as an attorney
for the.Texas Death Penalty Resource Center, left Texas to join the
Capital Litigation Unit of the Florida State Public Defender's office in
Miami. Writing for the Texas Lawyer, Brent Newton offered some in-
teresting reflections on why the affirmance rate was so much higher in
Texas than in Florida. The most significant factor he identified was
"the disparate quality of appellate judges in the two states, which is
largely a- function of the fact that judges on the Florida Supreme
Court are not elected in partisan popular elections, as are the judges
on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals." He also noted that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court reviews the weighing of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances in the death penalty determination on appeal,
while the Texas court refuses to consider whether a life sentence was
more appropriate in view of the mitigating circumstances. Many
death penalty reversals by the Florida Supreme Court come in cases
where jury actually recommended life imprisonment but the recom-
mendation was overridden by the trial judge.22
The availability of judicial override has yielded what Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor recently called "ostensibly surprising statistics."23
Only four states allowjudges to disregard ajury's recommendation on
the death penalty, and the same pattern has emerged in all four states.
In Alabama, trial judges override jury recommendations of life
and impose a death sentence almost ten times as frequently as they
override recommendations of death. In Florida, trial judges overrode
jury recommendations in 185 cases between 1972 and 1992. In 134 of
these, trial judges opted for death over a life recommendation of the
jury. In Indiana, the ratio was eight judicial overrides for death to
four for life between 1980 and 1994.24
Why are trial judges more likely than jurors to favor executions?
Justice John Paul Stevens put his finger on the problem in a dissenting
opinion to the United States Supreme Court ruling upholding the Al-
abama provisions for judicial override in death penalty cases:
22 Brent Newton, Capital Punishment: Texas Could Learn a Lot from Florida, Tex.
Law., Feb. 26, 1996, at 26.
23 Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031, 1036 (1995).
24 Id. at 1038, 1040 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be
"too responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet
higher office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must con-
stantly profess their fealty to the death penalty.... The danger that
they will bend to political pressures when pronouncing sentence in
highly publicized capital cases is the same danger confronted by
judges beholden to King George 111.25
Seen in this light, the high reversal rate in Florida may to some
extent be a corrective for the politicization of death penalty decisions
by judicial override in the trial courts. While Florida Supreme Court
justices are also subject to the same political pressures, they are at least
insulated by the device of yes-no retention elections, unlike the con-
tested elections faced by trial judges in Florida and by judges of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In the 1996 elections, three justices
of the Florida Supreme Court were retained with no opposition. But
retention elections are not always protection from the crocodile. Ask
Justice Penny White of Tennessee, or Justice David Lanphier of Ne-
braska, or Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph
Grodin and Cruz Reynoso of California. All of them lost their seats in
retention elections. It cannot be denied, however, that the crocodile
is more voracious in states that have contested elections.
Judges who vote to affirm in every death penalty case will be the
first to loudly proclaim that the public pressure of electoral politics is
not a problem. No judge would ever admit that his or her vote was
influenced by public pressure or popular opinion. It takes a truly sen-
sitive judge to even engage in the soul searching inquiry into the im-
pact of the crocodiles in the bathtub upon his or her decisionmaking
process. Since most death penalty trials involve lengthy proceedings
with complex evidentiary issues, there will be errors or failures of
counsel to be found in many of the records reviewed. An affirmance
is easily rationalized by the harmless error rule, or by a relaxed stan-
dard of competence for lawyers. Opinions that affirm are rarely scru-
tinized or criticized by the press, and when they are, the criticism can
be deflected or ignored by attributing it to "liberals" who are opposed
to the death penalty.
Probably the most insidious influence of the death penalty croco-
dile is on the quality of counsel in death cases. Judges who owe their
election to a campaign commitment to enforcing the death penalty
will be more likely to countenance lazy and sloppy lawyers. When one
compares the published opinions in death penalty opinions issued by
the Florida Supreme Court with those of the Texas Court of Criminal
25 Id. at 1039 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
[VOL- 72:41142
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Appeals, one encounters a profound difference in attitude regarding
the degree of competency to be demanded of court-appointed de-
fense counsel. As Brent Newton sums it up:
Horror stories regarding Texas capital defense lawyers-e.g., law-
yers who engage in little or no preparation for trial, lawyers who
were drunk or fell asleep at trial, openly racist lawyers representing
minority clients-are legion.
Unlike the state and federal appellate courts in Florida, appel-
late judges in Texas are generally willing to turn a blind eye to such
shameful lawyering.2 6
Regretfully, his observation of Texas courts is occasionally appli-
cable to California.2 7 Too often, the lawyers who are criticized by
judges are not the lawyers who slept through trials or did too little to
prepare their client's defense. Instead, judicial wrath is visited upon
the lawyers who do "too much" for their clients, by vigorously assert-
ing every conceivable ground for reversal. Part of the problem with
the review of death penalty judgments by state supreme courts today is
that the siege mentality afflicting the justices leads them to regard the
defense bar as the enemy. In California our supreme court watched
quietly as the governor dismantled the state public defender's office,
and then the court itself trashed the appellate project created to fill
the void. Largely as a result, over 140 of the occupants of California's
death row are not yet represented by appellate counsel. A recent
study by the Texas Bar Foundation concludes that Texas also faces a
crisis in providing competent counsel for death penalty appeals and
postconvictiori proceedings.2 8 The establishment of public defender
offices has been fiercely resisted in Texas, while the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals still debates whether Gideon v. Wainwright was cor-
rectly decided.2 9
The organized bar should be the loudest defender of judicial in-
dependence. When special interest groups or victim's rights organiza-
tions suggest that their unhappiness with a particular decision should
result in removal of the judges who rendered it, the judges are hardly
in a position to respond with a spirited defense of judicial integrity
and independence. Too often, the response is simply silence, which
26 Newton, supra note 22, at 26.
27 E.g., InreAvena, 909 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1996); People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419,
440-41 (Cal. 1989) (en banc).
28 A Study of Representation in Capital Cases in Texas, 56 TEx. B.J. 333 (1993).
29 See Ex parteJordan, 879 S.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc)
(McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (criticizing the United States Supreme Court for inter-
fering with Texas "sovereignty" by mandating counsel for indigents in Gideon v. Wain-
wrigh, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
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reinforces the impression that judicial elections can become referen-
dums on the popularity of particular decisions. When that agenda is
endorsed by elected political leaders at the highest level, courts are
left in a highly vulnerable position that truly threatens the principle of
judicial independence. Yet when it is appropriate for a court to speak
out in defense of the principle that indigent death row inmates
should be competently represented, the judicial silence is often deaf-
ening. Last October, when Congress cut off funding for the twenty
death penalty resource centers that were engaged in raising the level
of competence of defense lawyers in death cases, how many state
supreme courts did Congress hear from?
III. THE MEANEST CROCODILE: ABORTION
For nearly twenty years, a political war has been going on for con-
trol of the federaljudiciary. The climax to that war was the bitter fight
over the confirmation of Robert Bork as ajustice of the United States
Supreme Court. Unquestionably, the defining issue in that fight was
abortion. While the war is far from over, the refusal of the United
States Supreme Court to overrule Roe v. Wade,30 as well as its resolu-
tion of the constitutionality of parental consent laws,31 will move the
war to a new venue: the supreme courts of the fifty states. They will
now be called upon to determine the validity of abortion restrictions
under state constitutions. The "pro-life" and "right to choice" legions
will now be arrayed for and against the state supreme court justices
perceived to be their friends or their enemies, and many judicial elec-
tion contests will undoubtedly become battlegrounds for the "clash of
absolutes."
In his insightful analysis of the abortion issue entitled Abortion:
The Clash of Absolutes, Professor Laurence H. Tribe described the rea-
sons why the abortion crocodile can be labeled the meanest: "there is
a pervasive sense of mutual distrust that arises from the conspicuously
different social positioning and cultural orientation of the combatants
in the abortion war."132 Noting the lack of civility and mutual respect
in the rhetoric that pervades both camps, he concludes:
[T]he depth of division between the pro-choice and the pro-life ten-
dencies appears to reflect not simply different perspectives on the
value of fetal life but different orientations toward matters of tradi-
tion, change, sex and power. Such differences in turn reflect class
30 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 239 (1990).
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and culture in ways that cut across the divide between Democrats
and Republicans in our political life.
3 3
He also notes a real irony-that pro-life advocates are often pro-
death when it comes to the issue of capital punishment. Thus, our
crocodiles may frequently travel in pairs.
A glimpse at what lay in store first emerged in Indiana in 1984,
when the confirmation of ChiefJustice Richard M. Givan was opposed
by a group calling itself the "Remember Baby Doe-Retire Judge
Givan Committee." Chief'Justice Givan authored an opinion denying
supreme court jurisdiction to intervene in a lower court ruling that
parents could withhold medical treatment for a baby born with
Down's syndrome and severe internal deformities.3 4 Although Chief
Justice Givan retained his seat, the negative vote was substantially
higher than previous retention elections.
The only state supreme court so far to decide the constitutionality
of a parental involvement requirement for abortions by minors was
Florida's. The law was challenged under a state constitutional guar-
anty of privacy. In a 1989 ruling, by a four-three margin, the court
struck down the Florida statute requiring parental consent.3 5 The
opinion was authored by Justice Leander Shaw, Jr., the first black chief
justice ever to preside over the Florida Supreme Court. His opinion
was joined by Justice Rosemary Barkett, the only woman serving on
the court. Both were targeted for defeat by pro-life forces, which are
politically potent political force in Florida. Former Florida Governor
Bob Martinez owed his 1986 election to pro-life forces. Justice Shaw
faced the gauntlet in 1990. He raised and spent $300,000 for his re-
tention campaign. While the focus of the campaign was the abortion
issue, he also took some pot-shots from death penalty supporters for
his votes to reverse in some controversial death penalty cases. He en-
joyed strong support from the organized bar and newspapers. He was
confirmed with a 60% vote, 15% less than his initial confirmation six
years before 3 6 Justice Barkett faced the voters two years later, in 1992.
While she was opposed by the same right-to-life groups that opposed
Shaw, the pro-death penalty forces were more active in the campaign
against her. She was opposed by several county prosecutors, although
then-Dade County prosecutorJanet Reno offered strong support. Jus-
tice Barkett raised and spent $230,000, and won retention by a vote of
61%. Three other justices on the ballot that year were retained with
33 Id. at 238.
34 Group Seeks Ouster ofJudge in 'Baby Doe' Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at A21.
35 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
36 Andrew Blum, 1990 Vote: Two Issues Dominate, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 1, 1.
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margins of 64-65%.37 Subsequentjudicial retention elections in Flor-
ida have reverted to quietude, and Justice Shaw faced no opposition
to his retention in 1996. But that does not mean that justices in other
states can relax. Twenty-seven states have statutes requiring parental
consent or notification for abortions for minors, similar to the statute
struck down in Florida.
California also has a state constitutional guarantee of privacy, sim-
ilar to the Florida constitutional provision. The California Supreme
Court issued a four-three ruling upholding the statute on April 4,
1996, shortly before two new justices were sworn in.38 The new jus-
tices joined in granting a motion for rehearing, so the case will now be
decided by the newly constituted court. Just the grant of a rehearing
evoked loud saber-rattling from pro-life forces. A San Diego newspa-
per editorialized that Californians should wonder why their new Chief
Justice was leading the Republican-dominated court down this "outra-
geous activist path, especially when one considers where it led Rose
Bird."3 9 Even former United States Attorney General Ed Meese
chimed in, speaking on behalf of the Parents Rights Coalition: "The
judges ought to know that the public is watching their actions. That's
why they come up for election every 12 years."40 A Director of the
National Right to Life League announced the organization will con-
sider making the decision a campaign issue when five of the seven
justices will be on the ballot in 1998. Even prior to the grant of re-
hearing, right to life advocates appeared to testify against the confir-
mation of ChiefJustice Ron George, because of his dissenting vote in
the parental notification case, as well as the confirmation of Associate
Justice Ming Chin, because he said he favored a woman's right to
choose.
Thus, the meanest crocodile is snapping loudly in California.
While pro-choice advocates are in the political majority, no California
justice would be likely to survive ajoint campaign by right-to-life forces
combined with death penalty advocates.
37 Val Ellicott, Top Judge in Florida Fights for Job, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,July 4, 1992,
at 3.
38 American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 912 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1996).
39 Mark S. Pulliam, A Judicial Threat to Parental Authority, SAN DIEo UNION-TRIB.,
July 26, 1996, at B9 (editorial).
40 Parents' Group Hits Teen Abortion Action, UPI., July 24, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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IV. THE ANGRIEST CROCODILE: THE POPULAR INITIATIVE
The howls of protest and editorial teeth-gnashing that greeted
the intervention of federal courts to stay the implementation of recent
California initiatives designed to restrict access of illegal immigrants to
government services and to outlaw affirmative action programs were
not restrained by the reality that federal judges have lifetime tenure.
Many demanded the resignation or impeachment of the federal dis-
trict courtjudges hearing the constitutional challenges to these meas-
ures. More often, the courts that must address the legality of initiative
measures are state courts, whose judges must face the wrath of a frus-
trated electorate.
The initiative crocodile can be labeled the angriest crocodile be-
cause the promoters of initiative measures tend to take personal pride
in their handiwork, and take personal offense when a court messes
with it. The drafting of initiative measures usually offers little justifica-
tion for their pride. These measures frequently confront the courts
with serious questions of vagueness and need for interpretation with
little legislative history to guide their resolution. Initiatives frequently
contain sweeping or ambiguous language because of the drafting pro-
cess that produces them. Unlike the legislative process, where public
hearings subject proposals to adversary scrutiny and frequent amend-
ment, initiatives are drafted in secrecy by the special interests that
have most to gain from their enactment. Once signatures have been
collected, the language cannot be modified or changed.4'
As a legal matter, initiatives are entitled to no greater deference
than any other legislative enactment. As former ChiefJustice Warren
Burger put it, "the voters may no more violate the Constitution by
enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enact-
ing legislation."42 But as a practical matter, elected judges consider-
ing a popular initiative must face the same voters who enacted it to
keep theirjudicial seats. FormerJustice Joseph Grodin of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court described these cases as "hot potatoes," explain-
ing: "It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature that a statute it has
adopted is unconstitutional; to tell that to the people of a state who
have indicated their direct support for the measure through the ballot
is another."43 In California, voters enacted a wide-ranging criminal
justice initiative in 1982. While a challenge to the measure on
grounds it violated the state constitutional requirement that initiative
41 Gerald F. Uelmen, Taming the Wild Initiative, LA. LAw., May 1993, at 30.
42 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
43 JOSEPH GRODIN, IN PuRsuIT OFJUSTICE 105 (1989).
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measures address a "single subject" was pending before the California
Supreme Court, several justices were publicly reminded by elected of-
ficials that their reelection to the court would be strongly affected by
their decision on the validity of the measure, and the ChiefJustice was
publicly threatened with a special recall effort if the court did not up-
hold the measure.44 The measure was upheld by a four-three vote.45
The initiative crocodile claimed a victim in Nebraska this year,
with the ouster ofJustice David Lanphier from the Nebraska Supreme
Court. After he authored the unanimous ruling striking down the
term limits initiative, its sponsors came after Justice Lanphier with a
well organized campaign that raised and spent an estimated $200,000
for mailings, advertising, door-to-door canvassing and telephone pol-
ling. A controversy arose during the anti-Lanphier campaign when its
sponsors refused to comply with a disclosure law requiring the public
reporting of campaign contributions. They contended the law had no
application to judicial retention elections. Justice Lanphier raised
and spent less than $80,000 for his retention campaign. Although his
authorship of the term limits opinion was the genesis of the campaign
against him, his opponents also took full advantage of his participa-
tion in an unpopular decision requiring a showing of malice for sec-
ond degree murder convictions, which required the retrial of
numerous murder convictions. On November 5, 1996, Justice
Lanphier became the firstjustice of the Nebraska Supreme Court ever
to be removed by the voters.46
A judicial vote against a popular initiative thus carries a unique
risk, that the machinery of the political campaign that led to enact-
ment of the initiative will simply be redeployed against the offending
judges. That risk was noted by Professor Julian Eule, in his seminal
analysis of the problems posed by judicial review of initiative
measures:
In no area would judges seem more at risk than when they overturn
plebiscites. That voters are generally unaware and unmoved when
legislative action is voided is not surprising. Judicial nullifications of
ballot measures are different matters altogether. They tend to be
highly visible decisions ....
The greater visibility ofjudicial decisions respecting plebiscites
is not the only factor that renders such cases high risk for an elected
44 Gerald F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 333, 342 (1988).
45 Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
46 Leslie Boellstorff, Commission Won't Block Lanphier Effort, OMAHA WORLD-HER-
ALD, Nov. 2, 1996, at 33SF; Boellstorff, supra note 5, at 1.
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judiciary. Plebiscites pass as a result of well-organized-and usually
well-financed-organizations behind them. These groups are in
place to mount anti-retention campaigns should the judiciary thwart
their efforts. Monied special interests that have sunk considerable
resources into the passage of a ballot measure may be willing to
spend more to bump off the judges who stand in the way of the
measure's enforcement. Judges considering the constitutionality of
voter efforts are not likely to be blind to the specter of an interest-
group structure energized to carry out the same kind of voter cam-
paign in displacing offending judges that was used in getting the
plebiscite passed in the first place.47
The initiative process is available in twenty-one states. It is not a
coincidence that all but two of these states also require their supreme
court justices to face elections, many of them in contested races. The
initiative, after all, is a product of the same populist movement that
promoted the election and even the recall ofjudges. This crocodile
has a pedigree.
V. LIVING WITH CROCODILES
Our travels through the swamp with Pogo may offer some tenta-
tive lessons about how we can preserve and protect the vulnerable tad-
pole of judicial independence. One of my favorite Pogo adventures
was the crisis he encountered when asked by a friendly Momma frog
to babysit her tadpole. The tadpole was swimming in a mason jar
which Albert "mistook" for a martini with an olive. Pogo was ready to
climb down Albert's throat himself to retrieve the victim, but was dis-
suaded when Albert insisted on a farewell handshake. Pogo then
came up with a brilliant solution: he made Albert drink so such water
that the tadpole was able to swim back out to Pogo's arms. Pogo then
declares that the solution is "not so hard once we puts our minds to
it."
Once we "puts our minds to it," the problem of preserving judi-
cial independence in an era of judicial politicization becomes a ques-
tion of political will. Do those who value the independence of the
judiciary have the will to fight for it in the political arena? Do they
value it enough to put it ahead of their political agenda of gaining
"control" of a court for a political party or a special interest? Do they
value it enough to finance the campaigns that will have to be mounted
on behalf ofjudges who are targeted for defeat because of the unpop-
ularity of their decisions?
47 Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1581-83
(1990).
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The answers to these questions are by no means obvious. We can-
not assume that all lawyers, or even all judges, are strongly committed
to the principle ofjudicial independence. We have recently witnessed
the spectacle of candidates for the Presidency of the United States and
governorships of our largest states calling for the resignation or defeat
ofjudges because they didn't like the decisions they rendered. If law-
yers, who should know better, are more committed to gaining per-
sonal political advantage than to preserving the principle of judicial
independence, how will we ever convince the electorate they should
look beyond their disagreements with a particular decision?
There are many potential reforms which could make judges less
vulnerable, even if the principle of electoral accountability is pre-
served. Contested elections, especially partisan ones, have little to rec-
ommend themselves. While retention elections are no guarantee of
independence, they are certainly an improvement over contested elec-
tions. The timing of judicial elections should also be examined. In
California, we only vote on the retention of supreme court justices in
gubernatorial years, thus increasing the risk that judicial retention
could be politicized as an issue in the governor's race. Giving judges
longer terms is another reform that would enhance their indepen-
dence and put some distance between a controversial decision and an
election.
Many advocates ofjudicial independence stress the importance of
"educating the public" about what judges do and why their indepen-
dence should be valued. It has even been suggested that the normal
rule that judges don't publicly discuss or debate the reasoning for
their decisions should be suspended when judges face an election
contest.48 There are others who point out that public understanding
of what courts do doesn't necessarily increase public support for the
courts. Perhaps judicial survival is enhanced by judicial invisibility. I
find it hard to imagine how even the most reticent judges can avoid
controversy, however, when they must decide the kinds of issues that
regularly come before the supreme court of every state. The reality is
that every justice who faces an election contest to keep his or herjob is
a tadpole in a pond full of crocodiles. The more crocodiles, the
48 In ACLUv. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990), the court ruled that
a Florida Canon ofJudicial Conduct, which prohibited judges from announcing their
views on disputed legal or political issues, was a violation of the First Amendment.
The ABA's new Model Code ofJudicial Conduct prohibits only statements that commit (or
appear to commit) a candidate with respect to cases or controversies that are likely to
come before the court. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (ii)
(1990).
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greater the risk. A rule of thumb might be "Three crocodiles and
you're out."
If the past ten years is any indication, the states where judicial
independence is most gravely at risk are the states which feature grow-
ing death rows without any executions, states which have laws requir-
ing parental consent for abortions by minors, and states which allow
statutory enactments or constitutional amendments by initiative. Are
there any "three crocodile" states? Indeed, there are two such states,
and both subject their supreme court justices to contested elections!
The two states are Ohio and Kentucky.
Both states experience highly partisan and expensive races for
supreme court seats on a recurring basis. Ohio experienced one of
the costliest judicial elections in American history in 1986, when in-
cumbent ChiefJustice Frank Celebrezze spent $1.7 million to keep his
seat, only to lose to Thomas Moyer, who spent $1 million. The newly
elected Chief Justice voted to rehear thirty cases which had been de-
cided in the final weeks of his predecessor's term. After news reports
disclosed that he had received campaign contributions from lawyers
in five of those cases, he disqualified himself from the hearings. The
State Bar President commented, "The people with money to spend
who are affected by Court decisions have reached the conclusion that
it's a lot cheaper to buy ajudge than a governor or an entire legisla-
ture and he can probably do a lot more for you."49 In response to a
subsequent "reform" movement, the Supreme Court itself imposed
spending limits on Ohio judicial election campaigns. Candidates for
associate justice were limited to campaign expenditures of $350,000.
A federal district court judge held the spending limits unconstitu-
tional, and an appeal is now pending before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.50 Meanwhile, over $1.75 million was
spent on races for two seats on the Ohio Supreme Court in 1996.
While candidates stayed within the court-imposed limits, independent
groups pumped massive amounts of money into media campaigns.
The Ohio Republican party invested $305,000 on one campaign,
while a coalition of labor unions and plaintiffs lawyers spent $234,000
in the opposing campaign. 51 Ohio judicial campaigns tend to line up
on traditional political party lines. Issues like the death penalty have
not played a prominent role, even though Ohio has not had an execu-
49 Kaplan, Justice For Sale, COMMON CAUSE MAG., May-June 1987, at 29, 30.
50 Ohio Supreme Court Appeals Ruling in Judicial Spending Limits Case, POL. FIN. &
LOBBY REP., Nov. 27, 1996, at 6.
51 T.C. Brown &Joe Hallett, Post-Election Reports Show Last-Minute Spending, PLAIN
DEA.ER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 14, 1996, at B5.
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tion since 1961, and 169 inmates are waiting on Ohio's death row.
The Ohio Supreme Court for many years had the advantage of inter-
mediate appellate courts reviewing death judgments, so most reversals
occurred at the lower court level. Since 1994, the Supreme Court has
reversed one death judgment.
Kentucky has also been regularly setting and breaking records for
campaign expenditures in recentjudicial elections. In a 1996 contest,
an incumbent justice raised $625,000, including $520,000 from his
own pocket. He was defeated by a challenger who raised and spent
$150,000.52 Kentucky has twenty-nine on death row, and has not had
an execution since 1962. After the Supreme Court reversed a death
judgment in 1983, two thousand citizens of Powell County, where the
defendant had been convicted, signed petitions calling for the re-
moval of the Chief Justice. Shortly thereafter, Powell County was re-
moved from the judicial district where the Chief Justice had to stand
for reelection! Only two death judgments have been reversed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court since then.
The answer to the challenge to judicial independence cannot be
that judges must become more adroit politicians. If that's our solu-
tion, the game is not worth the candle. The adroitness of politicians is
inevitably measured by their ability to raise money. Here's what in-
cumbent justices on five other state supreme courts had to raise and
spend in recent years to keep the seats they currently occupy:53
Arkansas ............................................... $500,000
Florida ................................................ $300,000
M ontana ............................................... $250,000
Pennsylvania ........................................ $1.4 million
Texas ................................................ $1 m illion
It should be apparent to political observers throughout America
that the increasing flow of money into state supreme court campaign
coffers represents a cynical judgment. Such contributions are per-
ceived as a good investment by institutional litigants, with a potential
for far greater returns than other political races. In the 1986 Califor-
nia election, insurance, oil, agriculture and real estate interests con-
tributed $356,000 to defeat three justices. Plaintiff's law firms and
individual lawyers representing plaintiffs coughed up $425,000 to re-
tain the justices, with over $160,000 coming from one law firm and its
partners. While the celebrated case of Texaco v. Pennzoil was pending
52 Deborah Yetter, King Raises a Record $625,000 in Court Race-Most fom Himself,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 18, 1996, at B3.
53 Gerald F. Uelmen, The Politicization of the Courts: The Crocodile in Our Bathtub,
CAL. LIrIG., Winter 1992, at 33.
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before the Texas Supreme Court, the two oil companies contributed
$387,700 to the campaign coffers of five Texas Supreme Court
justices.5
Ultimately, the preservation ofjudicial independence in America
will depend upon the commitment of American lawyers to the cause.
If lawyers utilize contested judicial elections as an opportunity to
choose up sides and promote the candidates whom they believe will
best serve the narrow interests of their clients, while removing those
who participated in decisions that did not serve those interests, we will
get the judiciary we deserve. While the Supreme Court has effectively
neutralized integrated bars from playing any role in judicial election
contests, voluntary bars are free to do so. Unfortunately, the most
active voluntary bars in judicial contests are the special interest bars,
that seem more committed to the principle that their side should win
than they do to the principle of judicial independence. Too often,
judicial election contests see the criminal defense lawyers lining up
against the District Attorneys Association, or the plaintiffs personal
injury bar lining up against the insurance defense bar. As Pogo so
aptly put it, "we have met the enemy and he is us."
The most encouraging news has to be the Florida success story.
Despite two campaigns by right to life groups and death penalty advo-
cates, judicial independence is alive and well in the state of Florida.
The Florida Supreme Court maintains the highest rate of reversal in
death penalty cases of any court in the country, and in 1996, three of
its justices were retained without challenge. This seems to suggest
that if the challenge to judicial independence is successfully resisted,
the crocodiles may seek another feeding ground. Successful resist-
ance in Florida, however, included a strong, unified defense of the
court by the organized bar, and an investment of over one-half million
dollars by true friends of the court.
54 Uelmen, supra note 44, at 349.
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